Introduction
Spreads on corporate bonds tend to be many times wider than what would be implied by expected default losses alone. These spreads are the di¤erence between yields on corporate debt subject to default risk and government bonds free of such risk. While credit spreads are generally understood to be compensation for credit risk, it has been di¢ cult empirically to establish this link. From 1997 to June 2004, for example, the average spread on Baa-rated US corporate bonds, with a duration of 5 years, was about 182 basis points (at annual rates). Yet, the average expected loss from default on Baarated bonds is only 40 basis points (at annual rates). In this case, the spread was over four times the expected loss from default. The wide gap between spreads and expected default losses is what has come to be known as the 'credit spread puzzle' (see, e.g., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Driessen (2005) and Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein and Helwege (CDGH, 2003)).
Several studies have investigated the determinants of credit spreads or changes in credit spreads. The …ndings in some recent papers suggest that di¤usive risk premia, due to systematic changes in the probability of default, can help account for a portion of spreads (Du¤ee (1999) , Elton, Gruber, Agarwal and Mann (2001), Driessen (2005) ).
Elton et al. also argue that the di¤erential treatment of taxes on US corporate bonds relative to US Treasury securities can help explain spreads; for example, these authors estimate that 73% of the spread on Aa-rated debt with 5 years to maturity is due to taxes. Another recent strand of the literature has emphasised the impact of relatively poor liquidity in the corporate bond market. For example, Driessen estimates that about 20% of the spread on US corporate bonds is due to a liquidity premium. Further evidence that liquidity premia may be a large component of credit spreads is provided by Longsta¤, Mithal and Neis (2005) , using data on credit default swaps (CDSs). However, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) …nd that standard indicators of both macroeconomic conditions and liquidity can explain only a fraction of the changes in spreads. Furthermore, the studies noted above obtain their results either from regression analysis or from estimates of reduced-form no-arbitrage models of bond prices. It is well-known that structural models of corporate bond pricing perform as poorly, if not worse, in explaining spreads (see, e.g., Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) and Huang and Huang (2003) ).
1
In this paper, we o¤er an explanation that has not been emphasised in the literature. We argue that idiosyncratic default risk is what accounts for much of the di¤erence between spreads and expected losses. This risk has been overlooked because much of the literature has assumed such risk can be diversi…ed away. Jarrow, Lando and Yu (JLY, 2005) show that under certain conditions that permit the construction of diversi…ed portfolios there will, conditionally, be no di¤erence between spreads and expected losses -the default of any particular …rm will not command a risk premium.
We argue, however, that because default loss distributions are highly skewed, diversi…cation would require portfolios so large that they are, in fact, infeasible to construct.
Indeed, we provide evidence that even the most diversi…ed portfolios do not approach the size for which idiosyncratic risk can be ignored. This is consistent with "jump-atdefault", or idiosyncratic, risk being priced. The results in Driessen (2005) and Berndt, Douglas, Du¢ e, Ferguson and Schranz (2004) indicate the presence of jump-at-default risk premia in corporate bond and credit default swap (CDS) spreads, respectively.
If idiosyncratic risk is so important, how is such risk measured by market participants? We propose a measure of risk that is implied by the subordination structure of arbitrage collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Cash arbitrage CDOs convert the risk of corporate bond portfolios into securities with di¤erent levels of risk. This conversion essentially relies on value-at-risk (VaR) calculations. As such, we propose the VaR measure used to create the highly-rated senior tranche in a CDO -which is typically rated Aaa -as the measure for pricing the risk in credit portfolios. This measure not only takes account of the scope for diversi…cation in feasible portfolios, it also satis…es the axioms for a coherent risk measure, at least for non-Aaa portfolios. We then conjecture that once risk is measured in this way, credit spreads across di¤erent corporate bonds will be linearly related to risk. The link between spreads and default probabilities can then be shown to depend in a simple way on a consistent measure of risk and a market price of risk that would apply across di¤erent corporate bonds. The use of VaR to measure risk in portfolios is, of course, long established in the risk management profession.
However, to our knowledge, no one has as yet proposed VaR as a su¢ cient statistic for pricing credit risk.
To begin our analysis, in the …rst part of this paper we reexamine the credit spread puzzle. Using data on option-adjusted spreads from Merrill Lynch over the period 1997-2004, we show that the puzzle may be stronger than previously documented. In 2 addition, unlike in previous studies, we show that the puzzle is present in both US 
The Credit Spread Puzzle
One of the puzzles about credit spreads is that they are much larger than expected losses from default; in particular, they are much larger than can presumably be accounted for by the degree, and economic signi…cance, of co-movement between the factors a¤ect-ing the probability of default and the utility of the typical investor. For US-based corporations, the spreads on Aaa debt have averaged about 50 basis points at shorter durations and 74 basis points at a duration of about seven years.
Spreads increase signi…cantly as the rating is lowered down to Baa, and even more so for sub-par investment grade debt, reaching as high as 398 basis points on Ba-rated bonds with a duration of approximately two years. In addition, the term structures are upward-sloping for the higher-rated investment grade bonds, hump-shaped for Baadebt and downward-sloping for the high yield segment. A qualitatively similar pattern is observed on European corporate bonds, though the average levels of spreads are lower than in the United States. One useful metric for evaluating spreads is the ratio of average spread to average expected loss -the "Spread Ratio" in Table 2 . These ratios are a rough measure of the size of risk-neutral relative to physical default probabilities, and hence they provide evidence on the average size of risk premia associated with idiosyncratic default risk.
The very large size of these ratios suggests that such risk premia are a signi…cant component of spreads, in both the United States and Europe. While the spread ratios increase with credit quality, the di¤erence between spread and expected loss -the "Spread Di¤erence"in Table 2 -declines with credit quality. This suggests that, for a given price of risk across rating classes, the measure of risk being priced must increase in absolute value as rating quality deteriorates. Further discussion of these statistics and their implications for modelling credit spreads is taken up below.
Spreads also change over time. Figure 1 plots the spreads on US corporate debt for various rating categories and durations. As shown in the graph, spreads varied considerably over the sample period and they tended to move together across rating categories and average duration, although the shape of the term structure (not shown explicitly) varied through the sample period as well. In particular, in regard to our focus on the puzzle of the large size of spreads, it is important to note that spreads rarely fell below 30 basis points for the most highly rated (Aaa) debt or below 100 basis points for Ba-rated debt. 2 This calculation implicitly ignores correlation between default probabilities and loss given default. 3 We also computed expected loss using unconditional ratings transition matrices based on data from Moody's starting in 1985. The results are qualitatively similar. 4 
A Model for Pricing Corporate Bond Portfolios
To help illustrate various issues in the remainder of the paper, we layout here a simple framework for pricing corporate bond portfolios. We consider the class of intensitybased copula models now common in the literature (e.g. Li (2000) , Schonbucher and Schubert (2001), Hull and White (2004) ). Speci…cally, for each obligor i of a creditrisky security, default time, i , arrives according to a Poisson process with associated intensity i (t). Variation in i (t) is assumed to be driven by a vector of Brownian motions W (t), which may contain both common (i.e. aggregate or sector) and …rm-speci…c factors. Correlation in default times is captured using a latent factor/copula approach. For simplicity, we will model correlations in default times using the Gaussian copula, which has become a standard in the market for the pricing of synthetic CDO tranches. 4 Thus, in principle, there are two potential sources of default dependence in our model: …rst, the default probabilities across two obligors can be correlated due to the common dependence of intensities on the risk factors W (t); second, the default times across two obligors can also be correlated.
Suppose there are N issuers of default-risky bonds. Let L i (t) be de…ned as the percentage loss of face value on bond i in the event of default. Throughout we will assume that the prices of bonds are arbitrage-free, which implies the existence of a stochastic discount factor and an associated equivalent martingale measure Q. 5 Let
be the density that de…nes the change of measure from the physical probability measure P to Q. Following CDGH, we assume that the dynamics of (t) are governed by:
where
As is standard in the literature, di¤usive risk is represented by W (t), with market prices given by the vector (t). The presence of dM i in (1) means that the pricing kernel is also a¤ected by the default of individual bonds; the market prices on these jump-atdefault risks are given by J ;i (t). 4 From a technical perspective, any other form of copula could also be used. Investigating the implications of alternative copulae for the results presented below is part of our ongoing research. 5 In the current context where markets are incomplete, it is not guaranteed that this measure would be unique.
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A non-zero risk premium on default jump risk is equivalent to risk-neutral intensities being higher than their physical counterparts. To be speci…c, let Q i (t) denote the riskneutral intensity under the risk-neutral measure Q. The relationship between i and Q i is (see, e.g., Piazzesi (2003) ):
Thus, if J ;i = 0, then Q i = i ; otherwise, Q i will be larger than i . In the case that
Explanations of the Credit Spread Puzzle
Several explanations of the credit spread puzzle have been o¤ered in the literature.
Here we brie ‡y review the arguments and evidence regarding the role of taxes, liquidity premia, di¤usive risk premia and jump-at-default risk premia and their e¤ects on spreads.
Taxes
In the United States, corporate bonds are subject to taxes at the state level, whereas taxes may account for 34-57% of spreads. Note that, since taxes are applied to the level of coupons or yields rather than spreads, they would tend to account for a larger proportion of spreads in the higher-rated issuers. 6
One argument against attributing a signi…cant role to taxes is that the relevant tax rate depends upon where the marginal investor in corporate bonds resides. Since tax rates in some jurisdications are trivial, it is arguable that taxes have no impact at all on spreads. If this were not the case, all else equal, it would be very pro…table on a risk-adjusted basis for an investor to take long positions in corporate bonds simply by residing in a low tax jurisdiction. A second argument against taxes as an explanation of the credit spread puzzle is that there is less systematic di¤erence regarding the tax treatment of corporate and government bonds in European countries, yet a spread puzzle appears to be present on European corporate bonds as well.
Liquidity Premia
Even in the United States, most corporate bonds trade in relatively thin markets. The market for corporate debt is less mature and even less liquid in Europe. This means that it is typically more costly to undertake transactions in these instruments than in equities and government bonds, and investors must be compensated for this. However, one problem is that di¤erent theories of market liquidity sometimes give opposite predictions for the behaviour of these variables. Moreover, at a deeper level, it is likely that default and liquidity risk are linked together, which means it can be di¢ cult in practice to identify separate liquidity and risk premia terms.
In terms of the corporate bond market speci…cally, many issues trade little shortly after issuance because of holding restrictions on key institutional investors or the incentives on fund managers to construct benchmark portfolios. Yet, buy-and-hold investors are unlikely to require a large premium for liquidity. For instance, institutional investors tend to buy and hold the stock of available Aaa-rated bonds because there are so few …rms with this rating to begin with. As in the case of taxes, the impact of market liquidity on the price of a given bond will depend upon the marginal investor.
If the marginal investor is a buy-and-hold investor, it is hard to see how illiquidity could command much compensation.
Some evidence that the recent literature has overstated the role of liquidity premia in explaining the size of spreads can be gleaned from a comparison of spreads on corporate bonds and CDSs. The di¤erence between the CDS spread and the spread on a par ‡oater bond of the same issuer is known as the default swap basis. In an idealised case, the basis is equal to zero in the absence of arbitrage opportunities. be non-zero is due to greater liquidity in one of the instruments. However, since the Trac-x index was based on the most actively traded entities in the CDS market, it is unlikely that a large positive basis could arise due to a relative liquidity premium in CDS spreads. Thus, the fact that the basis on European Trac-x names has been positive suggests that the liquidity premium in European corporate bonds has been negligible. 8 
Di¤usive Risk Premia
How important is the di¤usive risk component in expected excess returns (or, equivalently, spreads)? An answer to this requires having estimates of both the volatility of returns ( m ) and the market price of di¤usive risk ( ). Table 3 as well. Expected excess returns are calculated as spread minus expected loss plus the (ex post) average slope of the term structure. 9 As shown in the table, the Sharpe ratios, across ratings and maturities, are roughly similar in size to those found in the equity literature. However, it is important to point out that the measures of volatility in Table 3 
Jump-at-Default Risk Premia
In JYL, the assumptions required for conditional diversi…cation to hold imply that
. Otherwise, default events will be priced. By making some simplifying assumptions in the pricing of corporate bonds, it is possible to obtain an estimate of the average value of J ;i (t) using data on average spreads, default rates and recovery rates.
Suppose w i (t) is the recovery rate on bond i in the event of default at time t.
Under Du¢ e and Singleton's (1999) "Recovery of Market Value" (RMV) assumption on recovery in the event of default,
the price of a zero-coupon credit-risky bond just prior to default and L Q i (t) is the (riskneutral) loss rate. In this case, the price of a zero-coupon credit-risky bond is given by
where r(t) is the instantaneous riskfree rate. If 
The second term on the right-hand side of (5) is the price of a zero-coupon defaultfree bond with the same time to maturity as the corporate bond. Thus, if S i (t)
is the spread on bond i, where y i (t) and y G (t) are the yields to maturity on bond i and the default-free bond, respectively, (5) implies
Thus,
The denominator on the right-hand side of (6) is approximately equal to expected loss. Thus, by (3), the Spread Ratio roughly equals 1 + . The statistics in Table 2 suggest that v varies with rating (and maturity), and the di¤erences across ratings are large, ranging from as high as 625 for Aaa-rated bonds! down to 2 for Ba-rated bonds at the …ve-year maturity. the jump-at-default risk premium is only 0.003%.
Size of Feasible Portfolios
Ultimately, jump-at-default risk premia will only be a signi…cant portion of spreads if Instead, it is perhaps more appropriate to examine the structure of open-end corporate bond funds. While the sizes of bond indices and bond funds seem to suggest that credit portfolios can gain exposures to as many as 700 distinct issuers, many of the securities underlying these products are not very liquid. In reality, an investor trying to construct their own corporate portfolio may …nd it very di¢ cult to achieve a similar level of diversi…cation with those securities that are actively traded. Arguably a better place to look for the portfolios of marginal investors is the market for collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), particularly arbitrage CDOs, since this has been a faster growing segment of the credit market. Arbitrage CDOs are vehicles for securitisation that rely on lower-rated debt securities as collateral and issue several tranches of notes as liabilities, the bulk of which are typically Aaa-rated securities. Arbitrage CDOs o¤er interesting insights for our purposes because they are structured precisely to exploit credit spreads that are wide relative to expected losses, and their success depends on how well they can diversify default risk. The extent to which they do diversify would then be evidence of what kinds of portfolios are attainable in practice. Table 5 contains statistics on the collateral pools of cash arbitrage CDOs, based on data from Moody's CDO indices. Most important for our purposes is the diversity score, which is intended to measure the size of the collateral pool in terms of the equivalent number of obligors with independent default times (i.e. it strips out the e¤ects of correlations). Across the number of deals reported by Moody's, the mean diversity score is 50.69 and the maximum is 64. Moreover, the long ramp-up periods typically required for assembling the collateral pool suggest that the average-sized portfolio actually being held at any given time by investors could be signi…cantly smaller than the …nal size of the portfolio.
Lessons from Arbitrage CDOs
Arbitrage CDOs not only provide evidence on the size and structure of corporate bond portfolios. The risk structure of the liabilities of CDOs sheds light on the pricing 12 of credit risk itself. This section discusses how the risk of CDO collateral pools is determined. The next section discusses implications for pricing.
As mentioned above, arbitrage CDOs are particularly interesting for our purposes because they are structured precisely to exploit credit spreads that are wide relative to expected losses. Indeed, CDO managers have been described as "seekers of spread", and issuance of arbitrage CDOs tends to rise when credit spreads are wide. 11 One way to interpret the term "arbitrage"in "arbitrage CDOs"is to think of CDO managers as essentially pursuing a strategy of arbitrage between physical and risk-neutral intensities.
We will show that the success of this strategy depends on how well the CDO structure diversi…es default risk. In the previous section, we reported evidence that the collateral pools of arbitrage CDOs are small in size, around 50-100 names. In this section, we will infer from the subordination structure of arbitrage CDOs what extent diversi…cation is attainable in practice, and, as a corollary, what amount of idiosyncratic risk is faced by holders of feasible corporate bond portfolios.
At the same time, the fact that CDOs are able to transform debt collateral of various credit ratings into a set of tranched securities, with the most senior tranche almost always being a highly-rated note with a Aaa rating, suggests that the credit market has developed a common yardstick for measuring credit risk that applies across the di¤erent ratings of debt.
An Arbitrage Strategy?
To understand the strategy of arbitrage CDOs, consider how a CDO manager might employ a collateral pool of Baa-rated bonds. The estimates in Table 2 suggest that such bonds would each have a physical default intensity of 0.7% a year and a recovery rate of 41%. In this case, the expected loss will amount to 40 basis points in annual terms. Suppose also that the credit spread paid on these bonds is 180 basis points.
If the collateral pool is perfectly diversi…ed, the CDO manager will not need to be concerned about unexpected losses from default (abstracting from di¤usive risk). By setting aside 0.4% of the collateral pool to cover expected losses, the amount of the remaining collateral will constitute a portfolio that has minimal default risk. The manager can then issue Aaa-rated bonds against this essentially risk-free portfolio. In 11 See BIS (2004), pp. 119-120.
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this example, it is the spread di¤erential between Baa-rated and Aaa-rated bonds minus the proportion of over-collateralisation. Here, the 0.4% over-collateralization will just equal the losses from default. If the spread on Aaa-rated bonds is 70 basis points, the arbitrage gain will be 70 basis points (110 basis points for the spread di¤erential and 40 basis points for over-collateralisation). For what is an essentially riskless arbitrage strategy, this is certainly an extraordinarily large gain.
In practice, of course, we cannot expect such arbitrage opportunities to be readily available. What prevents CDO managers from consistently making such large gains?
The short answer is that there are no perfectly diversi…ed collateral pools and the manager must therefore face idiosyncratic risk in the form of unexpected losses from default. The arbitrage strategy is not truly riskless. 12 To illustrate this point, Table   6 shows the liabilities structure of a typical CDO -the Diamond Investment Grade CDO, Ltd. I -as well as market-wide averages, based on data from JP Morgan
Chase. The collateral in this particular CDO is a mix of di¤erent types, but is mainly composed of Baa bonds. The total number of names in the collateral pool is 136.
However, the diversity score assigned by Moody's suggests that the possibility of default correlations would make the e¤ective number of independent obligors closer to 60 (the role of correlations will be discussed further below). The loss distribution for a portfolio of 60 independent obligors assigns a signi…cant probability to large unexpected losses, and the portfolio is therefore not well diversi…ed. This particular CDO issued notes in four tranches, with the senior Aaa tranche amounting to 83% of the total face value. The "equity"portion of 4% plus the mezzanine tranches of 13% represent the subordination required to protect the Aaa tranche from losses from defaults in the collateral pool.
Since the expected loss is small, most of the required subordination represents coverage for unexpected losses. Hence, the proportion of subordination is a measure of the idiosyncratic risk stemming from the limited degree of diversi…cation. 12 Conversations with practitioners suggest that one of the main appeals of CDOs is that investors value the portfolio expertise implicitly o¤ered by the CDO manager. This is yet another reason to expect we should observe large CDO collateral pools in reality. CDO managers arguably earn pro…ts by also exploiting liquidity premia in corporate bonds, i.e. by being more e¢ cient at assembling collateral than the typical investor. 14 
Pricing Risk in Credit Portfolios
To explain credit spreads, we need to specify a mapping between physical and riskneutral default intensities. This mapping will entail a risk measure, such that greater risk leads to a wider spread. In this section, we will propose a risk measure for credit portfolios and investigate whether this measure can lead to a positive linear relationship between risk and return.
Measuring Risk
In portfolio analysis, the most common measure of risk is the volatility of returns, or, equivalently, the variance of returns. The advantage of this measure is that it is easy to compute. However, volatility su¤ers from the problem that it gives the same weight to the "upside" as to the "downside." Hence, in general, it is contrary to our intuition about risk, which is about "bad"things happening. Nonetheless, if investment returns were symmetrically distributed, volatility would be a good summary statistic for the downside. In the case of credit portfolios, however, investment returns are not symmetrically distributed. For such portfolios, the possibility of large losses from default gives us return distributions that are negatively skewed, and here volatility would be inappropriate as a measure of risk.
How would we capture the downside risk of a credit portfolio? One alternative is to turn to the family of fairly complicated statistics known as lower partial moments. An example of these is expected shortfall, which measures the expected loss on a portfolio conditional on losses having passed some threshold in the tail of the loss distribution. 13 Among risk managers, the most widely used measure by far is a much simpler one called value-at-risk (VaR), which is the amount of loss that is exceeded at a given con…dence level. Indeed we …nd that this measure is increasingly becoming the standard for measuring risk in credit portfolios. 14 It is from this particular risk measure that we will draw implications for pricing. 13 Expected shortfall has been investigated by Artzner et al. (1999) , O'Kane and Schloegl (2002) and Albanese and Lawi (2003) , among others. 14 Other studies to examine VaR as a portfolio risk measure include Alexander and Baptista (2003) in the case of equities and O'Kane and Schloegl (2002) and Albanese and Lawi (2003) in the case of credit.
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Before we turn to pricing, however, we would like to comment on two objections axioms but not subadditivity. 15 This last axiom is important: unless a risk measure is subadditive, it will not recognize the advantage of diversi…cation. 16 Participants in credit markets seem to have found a way around these objections.
With regard to the objection of arbitrariness, the rise of CDOs has led to a convergence of VaR con…dence levels to the one that is consistent with the survival probability of Aaa credits. This con…dence level is implicit in the subordination structures of CDOs.
While there are variations in the way credit rating agencies assess CDO structures, the basic idea is the same. To properly protect the Aaa tranches, which form the largest part of the structures, the combined size of the subordination tranches is set equal to the VaR of the collateral pool at the con…dence level of the Aaa survival probability. tively. An expected shortfall approach corresponds more closely to the way Moody's assigns ratings (see Yoshizawa and Witt (2003) ).
the problem of coherence. The Aaa survival probability implies a rather high con…dence level -in our estimates, this is e¤ectively a con…dence level of 99.999% at the one-year horizon. At a con…dence level this high, the VaR risk measure will be subadditive for any two portfolios consisting of lower rated names.
Hence, we propose to measure credit risk based on the VaR of a credit portfolio at the con…dence level of the Aaa survival probability. So that the risk measure properly takes account of the size of the portfolio, we specify it as the ratio:
For purposes of illustration, we construct portfolios of equal-sized bonds for each of N names with the same default intensity and a common pairwise default time correlation .
In the case of CDOs, the amount of subordination is e¤ectively determined by rating agencies: they calculate the amount that will be su¢ cient to protect the higher rated tranches against defaults in the collateral pool at probabilities consistent with the ratings of those tranches. If, for simplicity, we assume zero recovery from default, then the required overcollateralization for a collateral pool consisting of N equally weighted names is given by:
where F B (N; k; i ; ) is the cumulative distribution for k defaults out of the N bonds, i is the default intensity for each individual name in the collateral pool and Aaa is the default intensity for the highly-rated senior tranche (for all practical purposes, the Aaa tranche).
As an illustration, assume that default intensities are independent across the N bonds in the collateral pool. Then F B will be a cumulative binomial distribution.
18 Figure 3 shows the required overcollateralization in proportion to the size of the portfolio, for each of three di¤erent values of i : one corresponding to a Ba-rated pool, one to Baa-rated pool and one to an A-rated pool. The higher the default intensity of the collateral pool, the higher k =N will be. Moreover, this ratio is a declining function of the number of names in the collateral pool. Although not shown in the …gure, it can be surmised that as N gets very large, the ratio approaches from above the di¤erence in probabilities, i Aaa .
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The relationship between risk and diversi…cation is clearly evident in Figure 3 . The …gure shows that the bigger the collateral pool, the smaller the overcollateralization ratio and the smaller the risk faced by the CDO manager. The fact that the overcollateralization ratio continues to decline with the size of the collateral pool means that arbitrage gains also increase. The CDO manager clearly has a strong incentive to increase the size of the collateral pool or, more precisely, the number of independent names in the pool. In spite of this incentive, however, the typical arbitrage CDO structured on investment grade assets contains only about 100 names in its collateral pool, resulting in an average diversity score of only about 51 names (Table 5 ). In the case of high-yield collateral, the average diversity score is only 42 names. Only a few
CDOs have had more than 200 names. Conversations with market participants suggest that it can take many months for a CDO manager to assemble the collateral for a given structure. It appears that beyond a few benchmark bonds, the cost of searching for additional names rises sharply, and at some point it simply becomes infeasible to construct a more diversi…ed portfolio. Hence, full diversi…cation is not achieved even by those investors who would have the most to gain. 20 An important point to note is that k is just the VaR of the collateral portfolio with the con…dence level set at F B (N; k; i ; ) = 1 Aaa : k = V aR Aaa (N; i ; ). In other words, the con…dence level is speci…ed to be such that the tail probability 1 F B (N; k; i ; ) is the Aaa default intensity. The ratio ! Aaa in (7) can then be interpreted as a measure of the risk of a portfolio with N equally weighted names, 19 Strictly speaking, the overcollateralisation ratio does not uniformly decline with respect to N . This is because k increases with N in discrete steps. That is, when k increases by one, say, as the portfolio size increases from N to N + 1, it will be the case that, since k < N , Aaa (N; i ; ). More generally, for loss given default L < 1, ! Aaa (N + 1; i ; ) may or may not be larger than ! Aaa (N; i ; ) when the critical value k changes. In practice, an adjustment for this type of granularity would be needed to make VaR, as a proportion of portfolio size, a monotone decreasing function of N . 20 Other factors, such as moral hazard, might also limit pro…t opportunities (see, e.g., Du¢ e and
Singleton (2003)).
each of which has a default intensity i , and where the dependence of ! Aaa on Aaa is implicit from the constraint in (8) . In Table 7 , we report calculations of ! Aaa (N; i ; ) based on di¤erent values for N , our estimates of i for various credit ratings and di¤erent assumptions about default time correlations. As was evident in Figure 3 , the calculations show that ! Aaa (N; i ; ) tends to decline with N and to rise with i . They also show that ! Aaa (N; i ; ) rises with default correlation (systematic risk adds to risk). Figure 4 illustrates this in more detail. Given i , a higher increases the required over-collateralisation ratio at every value of N . Moreover, as N increases, the required over-collateralisation ratio becomes relatively larger for high versus small values of .
Linear Pricing
We now investigate whether our measure of risk can explain credit spreads. In particular, we attempt to explain average spreads for each of four rating classes -namely, Aa, A, Baa and Ba -but doing so only relative to Aaa spreads. We will assume that Aaa spreads themselves are explained adequately by tax, liquidity and systematic risk. In our calculations, we match default intensities to credit ratings so that we can measure risk in portfolios for each rating. In measuring risk, we also allow the size of the portfolio and the default correlations within the portfolio to vary. Speci…cally, we examine whether
holds for credit portfolios P (i) and P (j), i 6 = j, where S P (i) (t) is the spread on portfolio P (i) and S Aaa (t) is the spread on a benchmark Aaa-rated portfolio. In (9), we specify spreads as di¤erentials relative to Aaa spreads, using the typical rating of the senior tranche in a CDO as a measure of risk in the benchmark portfolio. This also has the advantage of netting out the possible e¤ects of taxes and any liquidity risk premia in corporate bonds (assuming these premia are constant across ratings).
Ideally, we would like to test (9) by confronting it with a large number of cross- If indeed omega was the risk measure driving credit markets, then it should explain credit spreads. To test the plausibility of this idea, we conduct a pricing exercise by calculating omega for portfolios of di¤erent sizes, di¤erent credit ratings and di¤erent default correlations. We also compute (for investors who hold these portfolios to maturity) expected excess returns based on average spreads and expected losses from default, using portfolios of Aaa-rated bonds as a benchmark. We …nd that for portfolio sizes typical for arbitrage CDOs and for reasonable assumptions about default correlations, the relationship between omega and di¤erential excess returns is positive and approximately linear. We take this result as suggestive evidence that the risk of unexpected losses as measured by omega adequately explains corporate spreads. Notes: Statistics are cross-sectional averages across CDO deals based on underlying collateral. "Average Rating" is converted from the Adjusted Moody's Rating Factor. "Average Maturity" is a weighted average, in years. Source: Moody's. Notes: "Size" and "Portion" are averages, at issuance. Market-wide data covers the period 1987-2004. Source: JPMorgan Chase. Notes: As a percentage of portfolio size. 
